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W. G. Lewellen (1968) has recently estimated and analyzed the
after-tax incomes—including in "income" the value of the
various deferred-compensation schemes such as pension plans
and stock options—for the first up to the fifth highest-ranking
executives of 50 of the 70 largest manufacturing firms in the
United States in the period 1940—1963.' Professor Lewellen has
generously made available his data for our use.
Despite its obvious special nature, this sample is of interest
for several reasons. First, contrary to the situation with other
cross-section studies in general and high-income samples in
particular, this sample has an accurate earned-income measure.
Second, it is useful to see whether education differences are im-
portant for successful people, especially since it may be possible
to compare the results with the Terman sample of geniuses.
We have attempted to obtain relevant demographic charac-
teristics from various sources for each of the executives.2 We
have determined the education attainment, undergraduate and
graduate school attended (if any), and age for about 350 of the
500 individuals in the Lewellen sample. Consequently, we can
estimate the relationship between after-tax income, education,
and years on the job. Unfortunately, except for academic
'The Securities and Exchange Commission requires the basic information on
annual company reports.
2These are Who's Who in America (1950); Who's Who in CommerceandIndustry
(1940 and 1950); World's Who's Who in Commerce and Industry (1963); and Poor's
Register of Directors and Executives (1940, 1950, and 1963). Who's Who in Com-
merce and Industry provided the most comprehensive data. This was the first
source consulted. Poor's Register listed more names than did Who's Who in Com-
merce and Industry, but it was not nearly as comprehensive. Poor'slistedcollege
education only if a degree had been obtained, and in that case also listed the
date the degree was received.
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honors, no direct measure of ability is available. However,
view of the nature of the sample (very successful individuals
a narrowly defined occupation), we would expect the approprj
ately defined ability of almost everyone to be very high. More..
over, we would suspect that a measure of drive or ambition
would be a more relevant variable than mental ability as
measured by IQ. In addition, we do have information On the
undergraduate college attended by each individual, and evi-
dence exists that college quality is correlated with the mental
ability of those attending.3 The major disadvantage of the
sample is that, since it is not typical, no conclusions of a general
nature can be drawn from our findings.
Before considering our regression results, it is useful to consid-
er the characteristics of the sample from 1940 to 1963. Perhaps
the most interesting question is the distribution of educational
attainment over time. In Table L-1 we present the percentage of
people (for whom we have the data) in each of four educational
classes. In this table we have combined the data for the five
positions.
In 1940, approximately 23 percent of the top executives had
not attended college, an additional 12 percent had not grad-
uated from college, 44 percent had an undergraduate degree
only, and 21 percent had received more than one degree.
Throughout the sample period, there was a steady trend toward
more and more education of the people in the top job positions;
thus, in 1950 the corresponding figures were 14 percent, 10 per-
cent, 51 percent, and 25 percent. By 1963, only 7 percent had not
attended college (and nearly all these people had been in the
sample since 1939), and 8 percent had attended college but had
not received a degree. On the other hand, 55 percent of the peo-
ple had received one degree and an additional 30 percent had
more than one degree.
It is of some interest to compare these developments with ed-
ucational achievement in general and with the educational
composition of the managerial-executive class in particular. For
population cohorts born from 1890 through 1905, less than 15
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Wales, It is obvious, therefore, that top management had
received much more education than the population as a whole.
It is also of interest to compare the education of top execu-
tives with the education of all executives in the same age group.
The data that are more relevant (in ways described below) for



















1940 23 12 44 21
1941 21 12 44 23
1942 20 12 44 24
2943 20 10 45 25
2944 20 10 47 23
1945 20 09 48 23
1946 18 10 49 23
1947 16 09 52 24
1948 15 09 52 24
1949 14 11 51 23
1950 14 10 51 25
1951 12 10 53 25
1952 12 10 51 27
7953 12 10 52 26
1954 13 11 50 27
1955 12 11 50 27
1956 13 10 51 26
1957 12 10 53 25
1958 09 09 59 23
1959 08 08 57 27
1960 07 08 58 27
1961 07 07 58 28
1962 07 06 57 29
1963 07 08 55 30
One individual who did not graduate from high school is included in this group.
IA few people with some postgraduate work but no degree are included in this group.Higher education and earnings
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FigureL.-1 income
thiscomparison are not available. Some crude approximations Truncationof
obtained from the 1940, 1950, and 1960 censuses are given sample
Ifl by Income
TableL-2 for the category of nonfarm proprietors, managers level
andofficials 45 through 64 years of age. The distribution
the three education classes has shown little change overtime
Educational upgrading has occurred, however: Those withless
than a high school diploma in this occupation fell from about60
percent of the total in 1940 to about 45 percent in 1960. For mak-
ing comparisons with the Lewellen data, the data in Table L-2
are crude in several respects. The Lewellen sample involves ex-
ecutives of the largest manufacturing concerns. The census data X
include all types of companies of all sizes. In the 1960 census it
is possible to obtain the educational distribution of salaried
nonfarm managers and officials. This category should eliminate
many of the owners of retail stores and small concerns. Al. ables.
though, as shown in the last row in Table L-2, there are fewer educa
people in the high school and some-college groups, the distri- whok
bution is still very different from that given in Table L-1. This mine
difference could arise because reaching the top of the Corporate
ladder depends on ability, which is correlated with education. samp
As shown in our earlier work (Taubman & Wales, 1972), even In
for the age cohorts being studied here, the more mentally able cient'
students would have, on the average, received more education, samp
This may explain the high concentration of education in the educ
Lewellen sample. the
The above data certainly do not deny, and may even confirm, dowi
the proposition that more highly educated people. have a better zero,
chance of reaching the highest-paying positions in American posit
business. This sample can be used to answer several other in- ing I
teresting questions. First, we can determine the extent to which Su
education affects the income of the successful by using the that
standard linear regression model, in which income is the at ea
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ables. Second, we can attempt to determine the extent to which
education affects earnings for the population (of executives) as a
whole. But to use our sample for this purpose, we must deter-
mine if application of the usual regression model to our data
yields the same result as it would when applied to random
samples of executives.
In the discussion to follow, the "estimated education coeffi-
cient" is the one obtained using regression analysis on our
sample, while the "true coefficient" is the relationship between
education and earnings in the population. It can be shown that
the estimated education coefficient will infact be biased
downward if its true value is positive, will be unbiased if it is
zero, and will be biased upward if it is negative. The case of a
positive education coefficient may be understood by consider-
ing Figure L-1.
Suppose the true relationship is given by the line XX, and
that the representative distributions of income about its mean
at each education level are given by A, B, and C. Suppose also
that (after translating success into income levels) only levels of
income above Y" are used in the sample. Then, for education
levels corresponding to C, the entire distribution of earnings is
represented in the sample, while for education levels corre-
sponding to B, only the highest income values in the distribu-
tion are included. The effect of this is clearly to underestimate
the effect of education on income. Earnings and education val-
ues corresponding to A are irrelevant as they are not contained
in the sample at all.
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after-tax basis, on a before-tax basis, and on an The
before-tax basis under the assumption that the after-taxe
ploye
ings had all been wages and salaries. Although we Couldhave tk used any of the measures as our dependent variable, wehave
SOC
usedonly the after-tax income. Our choice was based onsever,
cross
a! considerations. First, after-tax income is the appropriateCOD.
opme
cept for calculating the private return. Since the sample covered
such a small and select group of people, it is not possible togen.
eralize to all college graduates; hence, a social-return conce t is
1
p years not worth pursuing.
In addition, we would expect that for top executives the after.
The tax return is a reasonable measure of differences in productivity
RESULTS
i for the following reasons.5 Suppose we ignore the fact that top eve
management has a large say in the setting of its earnings and
the composition of its pay package and assume that each firm
te e
tries to minimize costs by reducing its before-tax payments to same
executives while at the same time increasing executives' after-
Oft
tax earnings by altering their compensation package. If firms do
not pay managers their marginal product, other firms could af-
ca
ford to hire them away (unless the executives' skills were corn- ch pany-specific) and, consequently, firms will have to set the
i
after-tax pay package equal to the marginal product of each per-
son. Since firms should tailor the components of the package to
Cc
the wishes of their managers, after-tax earnings for a given tax bine
structure will probably differ from before-tax earnings by a fac-
man tor that is reasonably constant for all individuals in a given ditic
year. Years in which tax laws differ, however, cannot be corn- mdi
bined if there is a lag in the adjustment to the tax provisions.
A few other details concerning the income data should be
noted. First, the marginal-productivity theory is expressed in
terms of real wages. Within any year we can treat prices as the
samefor the members of the cross section, but in comparing feren
results for different years or in combining data from different as th
years, we must deflate the income measure. The deflator we exist
have used in regressions with different years combined is the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) with 1957—1959 equal to 100. We
recognize that the CPI is not really appropriate for upper-in- first
come individuals, but no alternative is readily available. Since little
Lewellen used a CPI with 1940 as the base year, our real-income tical
figures are about twice as large as his.
the
theafter-tax earnings are equal to the marginal productivity van
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Thesecond point is that, while individuals must be em-
ployed when in our sample, their incomes are still subject to
cyclical swings because of profit sharing, wage bonuses, and
stock options valued on the basis of stock prices.6 Within any
cross section, it is reasonable to assume that the cyclical devel-
opments would affect people with different education equally.
Over time, this need not be true, since the educational composi-
tion of our sample changes. Thus, when comparing cross sec-
tions, we included zero-one dummy variables for the various
years.
RESULTSThe data can be analyzed using regressions at many different
levels of aggregation. First, for each year an equation can be es-
timated for each position. Second, for a given year the effects of
the education variables on earnings can be assumed to be the
same at all positions, although the level of income also depends
on the position. In this case, we can have one equation for each
year with dummy variables for the positions. Finally, the data
can be combined for sets of years (after deflating the income
variable), while including dummies for positions and/or years.
Such pooling of the data assumes that the effects on earnings of
the independent variables are constant over time as well as over
positions.
Consider the question of whether the data should be com-
bined by position. Assuming that individuals receive their
marginal products, there is no reason to believe a priori that ad-
ditional education will have different effects that depend on the
individual's position in the firm.7 On the other hand, it is clear
'See Chapter 4in Lewellen(1968) for a discussion of this method of valuing stock
options.
7We have some empirical evidence on the effect of education on income for dif-
ferent positions. We ran some preliminary regressions (using years of schooling
as the education variable) designed to determine if, in fact, these differences
exist. Cross-section regressions for 1940, 1950, and 1963 computed separately for
the five positions do not suggest different effects of education on income. For
1940, the education coefficients for the third, fourth, and fifth positions are
marginally significant and have almost identical values. The coefficients for the
first two positions differ considerably, but have such high standard errors that
little significance can be attached to the point estimates. For 1950. the education
coefficients for the second and fourth positions are significant, and almost iden-
tical, while the others are insignificant. Although these results do not prove that
the effects of education are the same at all positions. they at least provide no evi-
dence of significant differences. Consequently, in the analysis to follow we pool
the data for different positions, thus forcing the coefficients of the independent
variables to be the same across positions.
the marginal productivityHigher education and earnings262
thatincome differences that reflect the hierarchical nature of the
firms' administrative setup will exist between individuals in
different positions within firms, even though they have the
same age and education. If the attainment of the higher Posi-
tions is due to such factors as ability and drive, whichare
excluded from our model but which are correlated with educa..
tion,then we should include dummy intercept variables for the
positions in order to avoid attributing to education some of the
income differences due to ability and other factors. It is concejv
able, however, that education better equips a person to obtain
the more senior positions. In this situation, the inclusion of
dummy intercept variables for positions would eliminate part
of the return to education.8 It is likely that the return to educa-
tion is bracketed by the estimates obtained through including,
and then excluding, the dummies. Since it is not clear which in- -
terpretationis more accurate, we present our main results for DI, I-
bothcases—that is, inclusion and exclusion of the intercept
position dummies.
As noted earlier, it is possible to study each year separately or
the fil to combine all individuals for those years in which the tax
fr
structure was constant. We have made both calculations. Con-
sider first the results for the period 1954—1963, which is the achie longest interval available. cant.
As Ic
=— 66.7—40.1PBK+ 2.97 (Age —E)+ 9.l3Coll + 62.5CGrad tions
(2.6) (3.4) (7.7) (.7) (5.6) $45,0




= 62.7—25.3PBK+ 1.89(Age —E)+ .2lColl + 53.6CGrad
(2.5) (2.3) (5.1) (.01) (5.2) the t
+ 51.2PGrad —69.8D2—84.5D3—105.4D4—116.2D5 dem
(4.4) (8.8) (9.8) (11.4) (11.9)
— rialf
R2 =.19(L-2)
where Y,, =after-taxearnings of the ith individual in the tth °The i
'°Part-
yearr
8Qfcourse,if there is no correlation between educational attainment and posi- PhD
tions, then the coefficient on the education variable will be the same.
Aand earning5262 AppendixL263
year, measured in thousands of dollars
Pthe Consumer Price Index, 1957—1959; equals 1.00
P8K =adummy variable for honors in college; the ca-
tegories included are Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Chi,
and graduated with academic honors9
Age =ageof individual
E =yearsof schooling after high schooP°
Coil =adummy variable that equals 1 if the person at-
tended but did not graduate from college
CGrada dummy variable that equals 1if a person
graduated from college but did not receive a
graduate degree
PGrada dummy variable that equals 1if the person
received one or more graduate degrees (including
any law degree)
DJ, J =2—5 = adummy for the position of the individual in his
In Eq. (L-1) we have included all individuals from the top to
the fifth executive for whom we have the necessary educational
information. In this equation there are several striking results,
the most surprising of which is that the 20 or so people who
achieved academic honors in college earn a statistically signifi-
cant $40,000 less than their colleagues with the same education.
As long as positional dummies are excluded in all our equa-
tions, the coefficient on P8K is always minus $40,000 to minus
$45,000. As typified in Eq. (L-2), when position dummies are
included, the P8K coefficient is still minus $25,000. Two tenta-
tive explanations for the negative effect of P8K are the follow-
ing: (1) while those who earned the PBK have intellectual and
other talents necessary to succeed in academic programs, the
non-PB K people who graduated from college and who reached
the top in the business have greater amounts of other nonaca-
demically oriented talents than those with P8K, and these
nonacademic talents are more valuable in performing manage-
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ill be the same.
firm
9The individual is credited with PBK whether or not he has an advanced degree.
'°Part-time college attendance was counted as two years, a college degree as four
years, a master's degree or some postgraduate education as five years, and a
Ph.D. or law degree as seven years.r
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terprepared them for the business world, but these
either did not give an honors award or gave one that was cordi
considered worth listing in Who's Who or elsewhere. For those trig t
who are still suspicious of this result, it should be noted that the r
when Eqs. (L-1) and (L-2) are rerun without PBK, the other coef.. In
ficients are only very slightly changed. tion.
For the period 1954—1963 the average age in the sampleis
$225,
close to 60, and the average income of a high school graduate in earn
this sample is $112,000 (in 1957—1959 dollars). Eq. (L-1) indicates four
that each additional year of employment after completion of resp
schooling adds $3,000 to income. Those who attended college of e
but who did not graduate earned a mere (and statistically insig- tion
nificant) $9,000, or 8 percent, more than high school graduates. grad,
Although just going to college did not add much to income, mor
graduation (without PBK) adds $62,500, or 50 percent, to a per- stan
son's income." A graduate with a P8K earns only $20,000 more tion
than a high school graduate. ficie
That college graduates do so well is not so surprising, but it dica
may seem unusual to find that those with graduate degrees earn the
less than those with just an undergraduate degree. Thus, while i'tot
the average college graduate had an income of $175,000, the tion
average advanced-degree holder had an income of only tro
$170,000. Moreover, since college graduates have been working
four years longer, they receive an additional $12,000 more than mie
an advanced-degree holder of equal age. This pattern also 195
occurs in the 1960 census data. For example, for nonfarm sala- had
ned managers, college graduates in the age group of 45 to 64 coe
earn approximately 50 percent, and advanced-degree holders 46
f percent, more than high school graduates. To find the same per- de
centage in returns is surprising, because our sample includes an
only the successful managers, whereas the census data include 0 (
some who have switched from a professional to a managerial
position and have had less time to reach the top positions in
pec their field.
The E2 in Eq. (L-1) is very low—.06--—partly because we have
included people from the top five positions in each firm
IS
d without taking account of the wage structure within the firms.
i
an
Eq. (L-2) enters dummy variables for the various positions.
12See
"Of course, since the person has been on the job four years less than a person the not
same age who didnot gotocollege,he would earn only$50,000
($62,000 —$12,000)more than a high school graduate of the same age.teducation and earn
264
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Before considering these results, we remind the reader that ac-
cording to our previous discussion, if education aids in advanc-
ing to the top, the coefficient in this equation will understate
the returns to education.
In Eq. (L-2), we see quite clearly the wage structure by posi-
tion. The average company head with a college degree earns
$225,000, and the corresponding person in the second position
earns about $155,000. Those with a college degree in the third,
fourth, and fifth positions earn $140,000, $120,000,and $110,000,
respectively. Once we have held positions constant, the effects
of education are somewhat smaller. Within each of the posi-
tions, college dropouts earn a minuscule $200 more, and college
graduates and advanced-degree holders earn about $50,000
more, than high school graduates. Thus, holding positions con-
stant in Eq. (L-2) reduces the coefficients on the various educa-
tional categories in Eq. (L-1) by $7,000 to $10,000. The PBK coef-
ficient changes from minus $40,000 to minus $25,000. This in-
dicates that those with PBK not only do not get as high up on
the management ladder but also earn less on a given rung. As
noted earlier, Eqs. (L-1) and (L-2), which yield similar educa-
tion effects, should bracket the true coefficient. With the in-
troduction of the position dummies, theincreasesto .19.
We have reestimated both equations including yearly dum-
mies. Compared with 1963, executives earned $40,000 more in
1955—1957, and $20,000 more in 1959—1962. Since these dummies
had only minor effects on the education and time-on-the-job
coefficients, we do not present the equations.
We also computed regressions in which we added a variable
defined as QXCGrad where Qisa measure of college quality
and CGrad is the same dummy variable as before. The measure
of Qweused was the Gourman rating for 1955, the earliest one
available.12 While the quality ratings of schools change slowly,
1955 ratings may be too far removed from the dates at which
people attended college, since even in 1963 most people in the
sample had attended college more than 30 years earlier. Still, it
is of some interest to use such a variable, since the best schools
and worst schools do not change greatly over such time periods.
Since by construction CGrad must be uncorrelated with all the
'2See Gourman (1956). The Gourman rating is available for subsequent years but
not earlier. The rating scheme, which we understand is not infallible, takes ac-
count of quality of students, faculty, and facilities.Higher education and earnings266
variablesexcept PBK and (Age —E)and since Qhappensto be emer
uncorrelated with these two variables, the coefficients on the colle
other variables are unchanged when we introduce the new van- coeff
able. The coefficient on CGrad, which indicates the some
earned if Qwerezero, is about $20,000. Each one-point increase the C
inQaddsabout $70 to income when position dummies are not posit
included and $50 when they are included.13 Since Qinour som
sample ranges from under 300 to 770, college quality differences anidl
could account for a range of about $35,000 in income, which is educ
less than the difference between high school and college gradu-
ates. It should be noted that evidence in Woifle (1954) and in forti
Solmon (1969) indicates that average school quality and average
IQ are correlated, but that within schools there is a wide range 1960
in individual abilities. Thus, the quality variable reflects both Th
individual mental-ability differences and quality-of-schooling PGra
differences.'4 earl)
The coefficients of (Age —E) from Eqs. (L-1) and (L-2) indicate toth
that an additional year on the job adds about $3,000 to income mity
if positions are not held constant and $2,000 if they are. That PBK
is, those who are successful and move to higher positions can tive
expect to receive, on the average, a salary increase per year
$1,000 higher than those who are not promoted. CONCLUSIONWe
We turn next to the equations obtained when each year is tive
treated as a separate cross section. In these regressions, we have tho
not deflated the income data; hence, in making year-to-year mos
comparisons, it is necessary to deflate all the coefficients. In the patt
following discussion, we shall ignore the results for the World sep
War II years 1942 to 1945. Table L-3 contains the results when nifi
the position dummies are excluded, while Table L-4 presents the
the equations that include the position dummies.
CO
Although the education coefficients in Tableare generally deg
lower than those in Table L-3 and although the positions dum- sch
mies always have the correct signs and are statistically signifi- nifi
Cant, the same qualitative pattern emerges in both tables. coil
Therefore we will only discuss Table L-3. An intriguing pattern the
wh
estimates are significant at the 5percentlevel.
'4We attempted to include a variable to account for nepotism based on a dummy II
variable with a value of I when the individual had the same surname as an older eral
person who had been an officer of the company during the period 1940—1963 fnt and in a few instances when a person was known to be related to the major
stockholder.Appendix L
emerges.For the period 1940—1941, the coefficient for some
college is positive, significant, and somewhat greater than the
coefficients for one degree or several degrees. Although in 1940
some of the people in the sample may have been the founders of
the company, the same result emerges in Table L-3, in which
positions are held constant. After World War II, the variable for
some college is never significant. Between 1945 and 1958, CGrad
and/or PGrad are generally significant, whereas after that, no
education variable is significant. From 1956 to 1963, CGrad does
not differ significantly from PGrad. PBK is positive until the late
forties and insignificantly negative thereafter. The time-on-
the-job variable is positive except in 1962 and significant until
1960 (1958 in Table L-4).
The consensus that emerges from these equations is that
PGrad is never very different from CGrad, and that except in the
early years, the income of those with some college does not add
to the income of the top executives. These results are in confor-
mity with the continuous cross-section results given above. The
PBK results are in rough conformity, since the variable is nega-
tive in each of the years from 1954 to 1963.
CONCLUSIONWehave studied the after-tax incomes of top corporate execu-
tives for the period 1940—1963. In the early part of this period,
those who attended college but did not graduate received the
most income. During the post-World War H era the following
pattern emerges: When each year from 1950 to 1958 is analyzed
separately, those with one or more degrees generally earn sig-
nificantly more income than high school graduates. After 1958
there is no significant relationship between education and in-
come. When the years 1954 to 1963 are combined, college-
degree holders earn significantly more income than either high
school graduates or college dropouts. In no case is there a sig-
nificant difference between the incomes of those with one
college degree and those with more than one college degree. In
the postwar period, college dropouts earn approximately the
same income as high school graduates. The above results hold
whether or not the executive's position in the firm is held con-
stant using dummy variables.
It is interesting to compare these results with others in the lit-
erature. For example, in a recent study, Shane J. Hunt (1963)
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TABLE L-3 Annual income-education regressions, 1940—1963









PBK the job Coil CGrad PGrad Constant R2
1940 19.0 2.1 30.2 19.8 25.6 —61.9
.10
(0.9) (4.2) (2.1) (1.8) (1.9) (2.1)
1941 9.8 2.3 47.4 18.1 24.4 —78.1
.12
(0.5) (4.2) (3.0) (1.5) (1.7) (2.4)
1942 6.2 0.8 9.4 17.0 18.1 —13.0
.09
(1.7) (3.7) (1.4) (3.3) (3.0) (0.9)
l943 10.8 .7 8.4 11.9 11.9 —3.9
.10
(1.7) (3.6) (1.6) (3.1) (2.7) (0.4)
1944 0.4 1.5 4.1 13.9 28.5 —49.6
.18






5.8 1.2 —1.2 4.3 11.0 —23.7
.09
(0.6) (4.3) (0.1) (0.8) (1.6) (1.4)
20.8 1.1 —4.1 4.7 9.1 14.7
.16
(2.7) (4.8) (.6) (.9) (1.4) (1.0)
—.5 1.5 —5.9 9.7 13.5 —34.0
.10
(0) (4.8) (.5) (1.2) (1.5) (1.8)
l948 —2.5 2.0 —10.8 6.5 17.5 —41.2
.21
(.2) (6.7) (1.0) (.9) (2.0) (2.2)
1949 —14.3 1.6 3.1 13.8 28.3 —27.9
.16
(1.3) (5.6) (0.3) (1.9) (3.4) (1.6)
. 1950 —13.2 1.8 2.5 15.2 24.2 —29.2
.12
(1.1) (5.0) (0.0) (1.7) (2.4) (1.3)
1951 —20.3 1.5 11.6 29.6 35.0 —24.0
.08
(1.4) (3.7) (0.8) (2.8) (2.9) (0.9)
NOTE:Figures in parentheses are Istatistics.
.
.
This result is substantiated by rough calculations using 1960
census data on the managerial occupation. Our findings
suggest the same conclusion even for people working in a nar-
rowly defined occupation who have proved to be successful. In
addition, we find that those with one degree earn approxi-
mately 50 percent more income than high school graduates—an


















































































































































































































TABLE L-4 Annual Income-education regressions (with positions held constant), 1940—1963
Higher education and earnings270r
Time on
P8K the job Coil CGrad PGrad
1940 21.9 1.6 22.3 17,7 18.8






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































position 2 Position 3 Position 4 Position 5 Constant R2
—29.7
(2.7)
—42.0
(3.6)
—50.4
(4.3)
—48.0
(3.8)
39.5
(1.3)
.16
—34.4
(2.5)
-'-46.9
(3.3)
—54.9
(3.6)
—54.3
(3.2)
32.6
(0.8)
.15
—30.9
(2.4)
—62.0
(4.7)
— 53.4
(3.7)
—66.1
(4.4)
45.9
(1.2)
.21
—83.9
(2.8)
—107.7
(3.4)
—111.4
(3.3)
—129.1
(3,7)
—28.9
(0.3)
.19
—109.9
(3.4)
—116.7
(3.5)
—141.0
(3.8)
—133.6
(3.3)
—21.1
(0.2)
.20
—91.5
(3.2)
—99.3
(3.1)
—138.2
(4.0)
—131.7
(3.8)
—10.9
(0.1)
.21
—53.2
(3.7)
—57.2
(3.6)
— 77.8
(4.9)
—103.5
(5.5)
90.7
(2.0)
.27
—62.7
(3.0)
—61.3
(2.6)
—101.5
(4.3)
—122.5
(5.1)
124.5
(1.9)
.21
—67.1
(3.1)
—100.0
(4.0)
—109.8
(4.6)
—122.3
(4.7)
118.5
(1.7)
.21
—60.3
(2.2)
—68.1
(2.1)
—110.7
(3.1)
— 99.7
(2.9)
72.7
(10.7)
.09
—92.3
(3.0)
—86.4
(2.5)
—123.8
(3.2)
—149.4
(3.4)
241.9
(2.2)
.11
—62.0
(2.5)
—66.4
(2.5)
—97.3
(2.9)
—123.6
(3.0)
134.1
(1.5)
.10